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JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW
This appeal is from a final Decree of Divorce of the Third
Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County entered on
September 20, 1988.

This Court has jurisdiction to decide the

appeal pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(h) (1987).

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

After a marriage into which the physician-husband

brought an established medical practice and assets having a
substantial value, was it equitable to exclude from the marital
estate the value of his professional corporation, certain contract rights, and retirement benefits accrued prior to the
marriage?
2.

After exclusion of the assets described in Issue 1, was

it equitable to divide the marital estate on an approximately
two-thirds to one-third basis to the husband and wife, respectively?

THE GOVERNING STATUTE
Utah Code Annotated § 30-3-5(1) (Supp. 1988) provides, in
relevant part:
When a decree of divorce is rendered,
the court may include in it equitable orders
relating to the children, property, and
parties.

i

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Respondent Harold K. Dunn, M.D. ("Dr. Dunn11) and Appellant
Connie T. Dunn ("Mrs. Dunn") were married on December 17, 1977.
Both parties had previously been married and divorced.

Dr. Dunn

has two children from the prior marriage.
At the time of the marriage, Dr. Dunn was 40 years old, had
practiced as an orthopedic surgeon for fourteen years, and was
earning approximately $71,000.00 per year.

At the time of the

marriage, Mrs. Dunn was 27 years old, employed as a medical
secretary, and was earning approximately $14,400.00 per year.
Mrs. Dunn ceased working outside the home in 1979 and contributed
little or no income to the marriage thereafter.
Dr. Dunn brought property into the marriage with a value in
excess of $423,000.00.

The property included a condominium, a

278 acre ranch in Idaho, a Porsche automobile, an airplane, an
established medical practice and accrued retirement benefits.
Mrs. Dunn brought an automobile with a value of $2,100.00 into
the marriage.
The parties were separated on October 2, 1986, after less
than nine years of marriage.

Mrs. Dunn filed a Complaint for

divorce on December 3, 1986.
The case was tried on May 11 and 12, 1988, with closing
arguments presented on May 16, 1988.

On May 26, 1988, the

District Court entered its Memorandum Decision.

On June 10,

1988, Mrs. Dunn filed a Mot ion for Reconsideration and

Clarification of Memorandum Decision.

The District Court denied

the Motion by Order entered September 7, 1988.

On September 20,

1988, the District Court entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce.

Mrs. Dunn filed her

Notice of Appeal on October 19, 1988.
In the Decree of Divorce, the District Court awarded assets
with a value of approximately $262,000.00, or 38X of the marital
estate, to Mrs. Dunn.

Dr. Dunn was awarded assets with a value

of approximately $437,000.00, or 62% of the marital estate. Mrs.
Dunn was also awarded alimony in the amount of $3,000.00 per
month for a period of three years.

Dr. Dunn was ordered to

maintain and pay for health insurance and life insurance for the
benefit of Mrs. Dunn.

The parties were ordered to pay their own

attorney's fees and costs.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
A.

The Parties' Circumstances At The Time Of The Marriage.

At the time of the marriage, Mrs. Dunn was 27 years old,
held an Associate Degree from the Stevens Henegar Business
School, and worked full-time as a medical secretary.
had been previously married and divorced.

Mrs. Dunn

Mrs. Dunn brought an

automobile worth $2,100.00 into the marriage.

At the time, she

was earning approximately $14,400.00 per year as a medical
secretary.

R000206-09, R000242 at 113, 144-45, 148-149, 155,

Trial Exhibit D-25.

At the time of marriage, Dr. Dunn was 40 years old, had been
previously married for seventeen years and had two children. Dr.
Dunn held an M.D. Degree and had practiced as an orthopedic
surgeon for fourteen years.

Dr. Dunn earned approximately

$71,000.00 in 1977. Trial Exhibit D-22, R000242 at 149.
At the time of marriage, Dr. Dunn was also an associate
professor at the University of Utah School of Medicine, and was
affiliated with the Shriner's Hospital.

Dr. Dunn specialized

then, as he does today, in total knee and hip replacements as
well as spinal surgery.

In addition, Dr. Dunn was a member of

the American Orthopedic Association, Western Orthopedic Association, American Medical Association, Association of Bone and Joint
Surgeons, Scoliosis Research Society, and other professional
organizations.

R000241 at 5, 13, and 16.

Trial Exhibit D-22.

R000242 at 14, 152.
By the time of his marriage to Mrs. Dunn, Dr. Dunn had also
designed and developed surgical tools and techniques, published
numerous

articles, performed

consulting work

companies, and held visiting professorships.

for private
R000242 at 153,

R000241 at 9-15, Trial Exhibit D-22.
In addition to his education, knowledge, skills, and substantial earning capacity, Dr. Dunn brought a substantial amount
of property into the marriage.

The property included net equity

in a ranch of $230,360.00, a 1974 Porsche worth $8,700.00, an

airplane worth $26,000.00, accrued retirement benefits of
$37,083.00, net equity of $22,493.00 in a condominium, and an
established medical practice.

Trial Exhibit D-25, R000241 at

16-18.
B.

The Parties' Contributions To The Marriage.

During the marriage, Dr. Dunn worked approximately 60 to 70
hours per week continuing a pattern he had established prior to
the marriage.

Dr. Dunn also traveled 40 to 50 days per year in

connection with various professional activities.

Trial Exhibit

D-22, R000241 at 14-20, R000242 at 152-53.
In 1980, Dr. Dunn became a full professor at the University
of Utah Medical School and Chairman of the Department of Orthopedic Surgery in 1981. Dr. Dunn continued to serve on professional committees and was appointed to board and officer
positions in the American Academy of Orthopedic Surgeons and
other organizations.

In 1983, he was appointed to the twelve-

member board of the American Board of Orthopedic Surgery.
R000242 at 14, Trial Exhibit D-22.
During the marriage, Dr. Dunn continued to develop new
orthopedic products and techniques.

Dr. Dunn and another doctor

perfected the design of surgical instruments for the implantation
of an artificial knee known as the Miller-Galante knee.

On

December 1, 1985, Dr. Dunn entered into an agreement with Zimmer,
Inc. (IfZimmer11) in which he agreed to license the surgical
instruments for use and sale (the "License Agreement").

Pursuant

to his understanding of the terms of the License Agreement, Dr.
Dunn also agreed to provide personal consulting services to
Zimmer to enhance the use and sale of the instruments in exchange
for fixed royalty payments.

R000242 at 40-43, 47, R000211,

Trial Exhibit P-4.
Dr. Dunn subsequently entered into two other license agreements with Zimmer.

Both of these agreements explicitly stated

that Dr. Dunn's royalty payments were contingent upon providing
future personal consulting services to Zimmer.
P-5 and P-6.

Trial Exhibits

To meet his obligations under the License Agreement

and the other two license agreements, Dr. Dunn traveled extensively.

Dr. Dunn estimated that three-fourths of the travel was

directly related to the License Agreement.

R000242 at 41-43, 47.

Mrs. Dunn decided to forego the use of her education and
skills by terminating her employment as a medical secretary in
1979.

Thereafter, Mrs. Dunn managed the parties' domestic

affairs including overseeing the construction and furnishing of a
new home.

Mrs. Dunn's duties did not include the rearing of

children since the Dunns were unable to have children.

R000242

at 113-14, 117-18, 155, 160-61.
After Dr. Dunn's medical practice was incorporated in 1981,
Mrs. Dunn performed bookkeeping functions for the professional
corporation.

An accountant was retained to perform the compila-

tions and to prepare the financial statements and tax returns.
Mrs. Dunn also assisted in the management of a family limited

partnership and most of the parties' other personal investments.
These duties required Mrs. Dunn to work approximately five hours
per week.

Mrs. Dunn was compensated for these services through

I.R.A. contributions.

R000242 at 10-12, 114-116, 156-59.

Mrs. Dunn traveled with Dr. Dunn approximately twelve times
per year to various meetings, conventions, seminars and conferences in connection with Dr. Dunn's professional activities.
Mrs. Dunn's attendance was generally not required or even necessary to ensure Dr. Dunn's progression within the professional
organizations.

For one year only, Mrs. Dunn was employed as a

secretary for the American Academy of Orthopedic Surgeons, which
employment required her attendance at certain meetings.

Other-

wise, the trips constituted vacations for Mrs. Dunn affording her
the opportunity to shop and lunch.

R000112, R000209, R000242 at

116, 163-166, R000241 at 21-22, 48.
Mrs. Dunn's daily schedule was such that there was nothing
to keep her from traveling with Dr. Dunn to the various meetings
as she had no child-rearing duties, did not work outside the
home, and spent only five hours per week on bookkeeping.

Despite

her light schedule and Dr. Dunn's encouragement, Mrs. Dunn
declined to further her education during the marriage.

R000242

at 155-58, 165-66, R000241 at 22-24.
In summary, while Mrs. Dunn's contributions to the marriage
were not insignificant, there is no evidence that she contributed
substantially to the financial success of the marriage.

The

District Court found that

ff

the period of the marriage covered

probably the most productive period of the Defendant's life, when
his abilities, personal to himself, increased the greatest
through really no contribution of the Plaintiff other than her
being married to him." R000210.
C.

The District Court's Exclusion of the Parties1 Separate

Assets from the Marital Estate.
The District Court excluded as separate property the value
of (i) the professional corporation, (ii) compensation under the
License Agreement, (iii) a portion of Dr. Dunn's retirement
benefits from the marital estate and (iv) other assets including
a 274 acre ranch, a condominium, an automobile and an airplane.
R000211-000215.
1.

The Professional Corporation.

At the time of the marriage in 1977, Dr. Dunn had been
practicing medicine for approximately fourteen years.

For tax

purposes, Dr. Dunn incorporated the medical practice in 1981.
Dr. Dunn's accountant, Keith F. Barnett, C.P.A., testified that
the net value of the professional corporation as of March 31,
1988, was $115,845.00.

The balance sheet reflected $79,000.00 in

cash, a receivable from Dr. Dunn of $53,224.00 and furniture and
fixtures of $13,935.00 less liabilities of $30,314.00.
Exhibit D-25, R000241 at 62-65 and R000242 at 28.

-ft.

Trial

The evidence established and the District Court found that
at the time of trial there was "not any substantial goodwill in
the Defendant's medical practice that was not there at the time
of the parties1 marriage."

R000212.

Mrs. Dunn does not

challenge that decision in this appeal.
The evidence also established that the value of the accounts
receivable and equipment of the medical practice were approximately the same at the time of trial and the time of the parties1
marriage.

In addition, there was no evidence presented to

indicate that the tangible assets of the practice which Dr. Dunn
brought into the marriage were substantially enhanced during the
course of the marriage.

To the contrary, Mrs. Dunn's own expert

placed a value of $135,706.00 on the medical practice as of
December 31, 1977, a value greater in amount than the $115,845.00
value of the practice as of March 31, 1988. Upon considering the
evidence, the District Court determined that the professional
corporation was not a marital asset.

Trial Exhibits P-17, D-25,

R000241 at 29-30, R000213.
2.

Compensation For Personal Consulting Services Under the

December 1, 1985, License Agreement.
Dr. Dunn entered into the License Agreement with the understanding that he was required to perform future personal consulting services on behalf of Zimmer.

These services were to

facilitate the design development, use and sale of the surgical
implant instruments.

For this, Dr. Dunn was to receive fixed

royalty payments.

R000242 at 40-43, 47, R000211, Trial Exhibit

P-4.
When Dr. Dunn and Zimmer reduced their agreement to writing,
they neglected to include the consulting services provision.
However, the testimony of Dr. Dunn and the course of dealings
between Zimmer and Dr. Dunn reveal that their mutual understanding and intent was that Dr. Dunn was obligated to provide
substantial consulting services under the License Agreement.
Trial Exhibits P-4,P-5, and P-6, R000242 at 40-43, 47.
At trial, Dr. Dunn testified that he was obligated to
"perform, lecture, [and] travel11 in order to continue receiving
payments under the License Agreement.

R000242 at 40.

It was

standard business practice for someone in Dr. Dunn's position to
"do a tremendous amount of traveling" in order to promote the
instruments which he designed.

R000242 at 41. Dr. Dunn believed

that it was an implicit, if not explicit, term of the License
Agreement that he perform substantial consulting services on
behalf of Zimmer in addition to granting Zimmer a license to use
and sell the instruments.

R000242 at 42.

The subsequent course of dealings between Zimmer and Dr.
Dunn confirm Dr. Dunn's understanding.

Two subsequent license

agreements between Dr. Dunn and Zimmer make explicit the understanding of Dr. Dunn and Zimmer throughout the entire course of
their dealings, that Dr. Dunn's royalty payments were contingent
upon providing future consulting services.

Those services

consisted of enhancing the design of the products and participating in workshops and lectures.

In compliance with the terms

of all three agreements, Dr. Dunn travelled 28 days in 1987
performing consulting services on behalf of Zimmer.

Three-

fourths of that time was specifically devoted to the License
Agreement, providing Zimmer with input and teaching other surgeons how to properly use the knee implant instruments.
Exhibits P-5 and P-6.

Trial

R000242 at 41-43, 47, 49-53.

In order to ensure that Dr. Dunn was adequately compensated
for traveling approximately one month per year, Zimmer and Dr.
Dunn negotiated and agreed to fixed "royalty" payments.

If they

had arranged for royalty payments based on a percentage of sales,
Dr. Dunn would have risked providing substantial consulting
services without remuneration due to the fact that Zimmer often
gave the implant instrument away free of charge in order to
promote the sale of the Miller-Galante knee.

Without a fixed

royalty payment, the License Agreement would have been virtually
worthless to Dr. Dunn just as the License Agreement was virtually
worthless to Zimmer without the continued consulting services of
Dr. Dunn.
3.

R000242 at 49-50, R000211, Trial Exhibit P-4.
Retirement Benefits.

The District Court found that during the course of the
parties1 marriage, Dr. Dunn accrued benefits in three different
retirement funds:

TMT77 / O 1

O /O

(i) the TIAA-CREF Retirement Plan; (ii) the

-11-

Shriner's Hospital Annuity Plan; and (iii) the Harold K. Dunn,
M.D., A.P.C. Defined Benefit Plan and Trust. R000214-15.
The District Court specifically found that the stipulated
value of the benefits accrued by Dr. Dunn in the TIAA-CREF Plan
was $21,573 at the time of the parties1 marriage, and $204,472 as
of December 31, 1987.

Based on the testimony of Dr. Dunn's

expert witness, the District Court further found that Dr. Dunn's
premarital interest in the TIAA-CREF Plan realized compounded
earnings during the course of the parties' marriage at the rate
of 122 on the TIAA contract and 15.7% on the CREF contract, and
that the value of Dr. Dunn's interest in the TIAA-CREF Plan to be
included

in the marital

estate was

$119,003.

R000102,

R000214-15, Trial Exhibit 25, R000241 at 59-60.
The District Court found that the stipulated value of the
benefits accrued by Dr. Dunn in the Shriner's Hospital Annuity
Plan as of February 19, 1987, was $122,016.

Once again, based

on the testimony of Dr. Dunn's expert witness, the District Court
found that, at the time of the parties' marriage, Dr. Dunn had
accrued benefits in the Shriner's Plan of $21,600, that Dr.
Dunn's premarital interest in that Plan realized earnings ranging
from 7.5% to 10.75% during the course of the marriage, and that
the value of Dr. Dunn's interest in the Shriner's Plan to be
included in the marital estate was $71,404.
Trial Exhibit 25, R000241 at 60-61.

R000102, R000214-15,

The District Court also found, based upon the stipulation of
the parties, that the value of the benefits accrued by Dr. Dunn
in the Harold K. Dunn, M.D., A.P.C. Defined Benefit Plan and
Trust as of March 31, 1987, was $244,054, all of which accrued
during the marriage.

R000102, R000214-215, Trial Exhibit 25 and

R000241 at 58-59.
In summary, the District Court found that the marital estate
included retirement benefits valued at $244,054.

Mrs. Dunn was

awarded $80,534 of those benefits or 332.
4.

Credits Granted To The Parties For Separate Premarital

Assets.
The District Court awarded the following credits to Dr. Dunn
for property brought into the marriage:
Idaho Ranch
1974 Porsche
Airplane
Retirement Plans (Benefits
at the time of marriage and
interest earned thereon)
Cove Point Condominium

$230,360.00
8,700.00
26,000.00
136,081.00

22,493.00
$423,634.00

The District Court awarded Mrs. Dunn a credit of $2,100.00 for a
1975 Cougar automobile she brought into the marriage. R00213-21.

D.

The District Court's Award Of The Remaining Marital

Assets To the Parties.
After returning to each of the parties the value of the
property brought into the marriage, the District Court awarded
property with a value of approximately $262,713.00 to Mrs. Dunn,
representing 3S7o of the marital estate.

Dr. Dunn was awarded

property with a value of approximately $437,088.00, representing
62% of the marital estate.

R000218-223.

See Appendix 1.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
In reviewing the decision of the District Court, this Court
should not disturb the apportionment of the marital property
unless it works such a manifest injustice or inequity as to
indicate a clear abuse of discretion by the District Court. Mrs.
Dunn has the burden to prove the abuse of discretion by a clear
preponderance of the evidence.
The property brought into the marriage by Dr. and Mrs. Dunn
is separate property and does not constitute part of the marital
estate.

Dr. Dunn brought the assets of a medical practice into

the marriage.

At the time of divorce, Dr. Dunn had an incorpo-

rated medical practice with a value of approximately the same
amount as the value of the unincorporated medical practice at the
time of the marriage.

The law and equity require that Dr. Dunn

be awarded the value of the medical practice as separate
property.
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ARGUMENT
Tli e Standard For A p p e l l a t e Review.
*-

• u r i i e r v«

Turner,

649 P. 2d

•Supreme Court: stated:
A l t h o u g h this Court m a y w e i g h _;*u wVi^ci.c^
and substitute its judgment for that of the
trial court in divorce a c t i o n s , this Court
w i l l not do so lightly ard m e r e 1 ^ Vi^m.co — -

<

u

judgment may differ from that of the trial
judge. A trial court's apportionment of
marital property will not be disturbed unless
it works such a manifest injustice or inequity as to indicate a clear abuse of
discretion.
Id. at 8 (citations omitted).
In McCrary v. McCrary, 599 P.2d 1248 (Utah 1979), the Utah
Supreme Court clearly placed the burden for establishing such
abuse of discretion on the party seeking reversal.

The McCrary

Court stated that
a party seeking a reversal of the trial court
must prove a misunderstanding or misapplication of the law resulting in substantial and
prejudicial error, or that the evidence
clearly preponderated against the findings,
or that such a serious inequity resulted from
the order as to constitute an abuse of the
trial courtfs discretion.
Id. at 1250.

The abuse of the trial court's discretion must

be proven by a clear preponderance of the evidence.

Berger v.

Berger, 713 P.2d 695, 697 (Utah 1985).
In this case, the apportionment of the marital estate by the
District Court does not constitute a manifest injustice toward
Mrs. Dunn so as to indicate a clear abuse of discretion.

Fur-

ther, Mrs. Dunn has failed to prove abuse of discretion by a
clear preponderance of the evidence.

Accordingly, the decision

of the District Court should be affirmed.
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Dr. Dunn spent fourteen years prior to the marriage developing his medical practice.

During those fourteen years and

approximately four years during the marriage, Dr. Dunn conducted
his practice as a sole proprietor.

In 1981, Dr. Dunn incorpo-

rated the practice for certain tax benefits.
At the time of the divorce, the professional corporation had
a net value of $115,845.00.

The assets and liabilities of the

professional corporation consisted of cash of $79,000.00, an
employee receivable from Dr. Dunn of $53,224.00, equipment and
leasehold

improvements

of

$13,935.00

and

liabilities

of

$30,314.00.
Mrs. Dunn's expert estimated that the value of the unincorporated practice at the time of the marriage was $135,706.00, an
amount in excess of the net value of $115,845.00 at the time of
the divorce.

Trial Exhibits P-17, D-25.

Dr. Dunn testified that

the accounts receivable, equipment and nature of the unincorporated practice at the time of the marriage was the same as that
of the professional corporation at the time of the divorce.
R000241 at 17-18, 29-30.
Relying on Gardner v. Gardner, 748 P.2d 1076 (Utah 1988),
and

Lee v. Lee, 744 P.2d 1378 (Utah App. 1987), Mrs. Dunn argues

that the net tangible assets of Dr. Dunn's professional corporation should be included in the marital estate.
reliance is misplaced.
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In this case, however, the "business11 was established and
its value actualized long before the marriage.

Moreover, Mrs.

Dunn worked only five hours per week performing bookkeeping
activities although she did perform the majority of the domestic
duties and, of course, Mrs. Dunn did not have child rearing
responsibilities.
The application of the law as set forth in Burke, 773 P.2d
133 (Utah 1987) and Preston v. Preston, 646 P.2d 705 (Utah 1982),
is more appropriate to the facts of the instant case.

In Burke,

the wife inherited real property during the marriage.

No

improvements were made to the property and the parties did
nothing to enhance its value.

From the time of inheritance, the

property increased in value solely due to inflation of real
estate values.

The Burke Court held that the husband was not

entitled to share in the appreciation in value of the property
particularly since he had made no contribution thereto.

7 73 P.2d

at 135-36.
In Preston, the wife inherited improved real property.

The

husband, who performed legal services for the decedent's estate
for one-half the regular fee and performed legal work on the
property, argued that he should have been awarded a one-half
interest in the property.

The Preston Court held that

f!

[e]ven

though the husband did some work on this property, he was not
thereby joining his efforts in a ffamily project1 . . . .
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relative contributions of the parties.

Mrs. Dunn

has not met her burden of marshalling the evidence and demonstrating that the evidence is so lacking that a clear and reversible error is present.

Newmeyer v. Newmeyer, 745 P.2d 1276,

1278 (Utah 1987).
2.

The License Agreement.

Mrs. Dunn also appeals the decision of the District Court
that the License Agreement constitutes separate property.

Mrs.

Dunn correctly states the proposition of law that marital property includes royalty rights on literary works and inventions
derived from the creative efforts, time and skill of a party
during the marriage.

E.g., Worth v. Worth, 195 Cal. App. 3d 768,

241 Cal. Rptr. 135 (1987); Wilkins v. Stout, 588 P.2d 145 (Utah
1978).

However, these cases are not applicable to the facts of

the instant case.
During the approximately eighteen years of schooling,
residency, internship, and practice prior to the marriage, Dr.
Dunn accumulated the knowledge, skill and expertise to develop
new orthopedic products and surgical techniques and procedures.
By December of 1985, the then twenty-six year process had culminated in the development of the design of surgical instruments
for the implantation of an artificial knee known as the MillerGalante knee.

On December 1, 1985, Dr. Dunn entered into the

License Agreement with Zimmer.

Subsequently, Dr. Dunn entered

into two other agreements with Zimmer, both of which explicitly

state*
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confirm the xmderstanding between Dr. Dunn and Zimmer relative to
the License Agreement that the "royalty11 payments were contingent
upon Dr. Dunnfs providing consulting services.

R000242 at 40.

As testified to by Dr. Dunn and as found by the Court, Dr. Dunn's
"understanding with the 'Zimmer1 people is that he would continue
to render these services and to travel extensively and that there
was no way to separate the amount of service he was rendering on
behalf of the Knee Contract as opposed to the [other contracts].ff
R000112.

The Court specifically found "that without his con-

tinued services, the knee and hip contract would be virtually
worthless.ff

R000113.

It is well-established

that compensation for personal

services performed after the dissolution of a marriage is the
sole property of the person providing the services.

See

Woodward v. Woodward, 656 P.2d 431, 432-33 (Utah 1982) (if the
right to a benefit or asset has not accured during the marriage,
it is not subject to equitable distribution); Wilkins, 588 P.2d
at 146 (trial court is without authority to award property to be
acquired after the divorce decree).
Third, Mrs. Dunn once again exalts form over substance by
emphasizing that the compensation was reported on Dr. Dunn's tax
returns as royalties from the sale of property.

Characterizing

the compensation as a royalty payment resulted in favorable tax
treatment which accrued to the benefit of both Dr. and Mrs. Dunn.
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evidence of the present value of the retirement plans at the time
of trial.
In Bailey v. Bailey, 745 P.2d 830 (Utah App. 1987), this
Court stated that
[t]the distribution of retirement benefits
should generally be postponed until benefits
are received or at least until the earner is
eligible to retire. That is particularly
true where there is a sparsity of other
divisible assets. See Kikkert, 427 A.2d at
80. However, the trial court retains the
discretion to divide the retirement account
along with other assets at the time the
divorce is entered. If that discretion is
exercised, the court must make specific
findings as to reasons for immediate distribution. Such reasons might include, (for
example), an agreement of the parties,
imminency of retirement, retirement accounts
not managed by a trustee, a short marriage,
age differential of the parties, or unusual
hostility between the parties.
Id. at 832-3.

As discussed below, the instant case is factually

the exception referred to in Bailey where a present value
analysis and immediate distribution are appropriate.
First, the District Court heard evidence and made detailed
findings regarding the value of the retirement plans at the time
of marriage and divorce and the earnings thereon during the
marriage.

This evidence was necessary to properly consider a

present value analysis.

Second, the Dunns had a marital estate

with sufficient divisible assets available so that an early
distribution to Mrs. Dunn was feasible.

Finally, although the

District Court did not make specific findings as to the reasons
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In summary, the District Court heard competent evidence to
determine the value of the retirement plans at the time of
marriage, the earnings thereon during the marriage and the value
of the retirement plans at the time of divorce.

The present

value analysis performed and other facts of this case support
immediate distribution.
4.

The Credits Granted To the Parties For Separate Assets

Were Appropriate.
As indicated in the Statement of Facts, Dr. Dunn brought
identified property worth more than $423,000.00 into the marriage.

Mrs,, Dunn brought identified property worth $2,100.00

into the marriage.

Mrs. Dunn argues that some, but not all, of

the credits awarded by the District Court for such property
constitute reversible error. 'Mrs. Dunn fails to explain why she
apparently agrees with the District Court's decision to award Dr.
Dunn a $230,360.00 credit for the ranch in Idaho and Mrs. Dunn a
$2,100.00 credit for the 1975 Cougar, but disagrees with the
award of credits for other property brought into the marriage.
More importantly, the case law is clearly contrary to Mrs.
Dunn's contentions.

First, a case directly on point is Jesperson

v. Jesperson, 610 P.2d 327 (Utah 1980).

In Jesperson, the Utah

Supreme Court stated:
In making a property division, a court may
properly consider such things as the length
of the marriage and the parties' respective
contributions to the marriage. This marriage
lasted less than six years and no children
issued therefrom. Plaintiff brought into the

marriage furniture
- , ^ uiw^xxc
a total of $22,500 in savings; defendant
brought no assets into the marriage. In the
decree, plaintiff was awarded the furniture,
a car, and the purchase price of a mobile
home, all of approximately the same value as
those Items brought into the marriage b}7
Plaintiff. The court specifically found that
u
[t]he purchase price of the mobile home and
lot in issue was $19,027, which was contributed from Plaintiff's separate funds . .
•f! It was not unreasonable for the court to
permlF plaintiff to withdraw from the marital
property the equivalent of those asse"t¥
plaintiff brought into the marriage. All
that may be considered to be marital property
acquired through the joint efforts of the
parties was therefore the proceeds from *:he
sale of the St. George home over and above
its purchase price of $19,027. The 771-231
split of the residual assets is not, under
tne facts presented, inequitable. This is
particularly so when viewed in light of the
fact that it was plaintiff's financial""
ability alone that permitted the purchase of
the mobile horned Except for said fact, there
would have been no profits of sale to be
divided.
Id,
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Newmeyer v. Newmeyer, 745 P. 2d

1276, 1277 (Utah 1987).
Third, the $22,493.00 credit given to Dr. Dunn for the promissory note was also in accordance with Utah law.

This credit

represents the equity of the Cove Point condominium which Dr.
Dunn brought: into the marriage.

The fact that the promissory

note was payable to the parties jointly does not conclusively
establish that a gift to Mrs. Dunn was intended.
P. 2d at 328.

Jesperson, 610

Rather, Mrs. Dunn must show that the note was

placed in the parties1 joint names

ff

in such a manner11 as to

evidence an intent to make it marital property.

Mortensen, 760

P.2d at 307. Mrs. Dunn has not established this.
Finally, the value of retirement plans on the date of the
marriage constitutes separate property.

Preston, 646 P.2d 705.

Similarly, Mrs. Dunn is not entitled to share in the accrued
interest thereon, because she has made no contribution toward the
appreciation in value realized.

Id. at 706; Burke, 733 P.2d at

135-36.
The fact that Dr. Dunn kept no records as to the premarital
values and the interest accruals thereon is irrelevant in light
of the fact that Mrs. Dunn does not, apparently, dispute the
competency of the evidence presented by Dr. Dunn's expert in
Trial Exhibit D-25.

The values at the time of the marriage and

the interest thereon were derived from evidence prepared by Mr.
Barnett and the respective administrators of the plans.

Also lacking in merit is Mrs. Dunnfs assertion that Dr. Dunn
never indicated any intention that those accruals constituted
separate property.

The real question is whether or not Dr. Dunn

clearly and affirmatively evidenced an intent to treat such
separate property as marital property.

Mortensen, 760 P. 2d at

307.
In summary, the credits granted to the parties for separate
assets brought into the marriage were appropriate and equitable.
C.

The Marital Estate Was Apportioned On an Equitable

Basis.
In Turner v. Turner, the Utah Supreme Court noted that
f,

[t]here is no fixed rule or formula for the distribution of a

marital estate."

649 P.2d

at 8.

Mathematical inequality "is

not sufficient grounds to constitute an abuse of discretion,
since a fair and equitable property distribution is not necessarily an equal distribution."
789 (Utah App. 1987).

Colman v. Colman, 743 P.2d 782,

The duty of the court is "to make a

division of the property and income in a divorce proceeding so
that the parties may readjust their lives to the new situation as
well as possible." Id.
The Turner Court noted numerous factors which should be
considered in adjusting the rights and obligations of the
parties.
They include: the respective ages of the
parties; what each may have given up for the
marriage; what money or property each put
into the marriage; the physical and mental
_Q1

health of the parties; the relative ability,
training and education of the parties; the
duration of the marriage; the present income
of the parties; the efforts exerted by the
parties in acquiring marital property; the
present mental and physical age of the
parties; the life expectancy of the parties;
the ability of the wife to provide income for
herself; and the ability of the husband to
provide support.
Id. at 8.
case:

The following factors are also relevant in the instant

the standard of living of each party before the marriage,

the number and age of the children reared, and the happiness and
pleasure, or lack thereof, experienced during the marriage.
MacDonald, 236 P.2d at 1070.
Applying the factors set forth in Turner and MacDonald, the
38% to 62% division is equitable.

First, Dr. Dunn, age 50, is

thirteen years older than Mrs. Dunn, age 37. Mrs. Dunn will have
the opportunity to work thirteen years after Dr. Dunn retires.
Additionally, due to his occupation as a surgeon, Dr. Dunn may
have to retire at a younger age than Mrs. Dunn.
Second, neither party gave up substantial opportunities to
enter into the marriage.
surgeon.

Dr. Dunn was already an established

Dr. Dunn's earning capacity actually allowed Mrs. Dunn

to terminate her full-time employment and enjoy a life style she
would never have achieved or enjoyed on her own.

Even during the

marriage, however, Dr. Dunn encouraged Mrs. Dunn to complete her
education.

Third, Dr. Dunn brought money and property in excess of
$423,000.00 into the marriage, but Mrs. Dunn brought only an
automobile worth $2,100.00.

This factor should bear heavily on

the property received at the termination of the marriage.
Fourth, both parties are able-bodied and suffer no conditions which would impair their income producing capacity and
ability to support themselves.
Fifth, Dr. Dunn brought a medical degree and fourteen years
of practice as a surgeon into the marriage.

He also brought

academic and professional appointments and the knowledge and
skill to perfect the design of surgical instruments.

Mrs. Dunn

brought a two-year associates degree and training as a medical
secretary.
Sixth, the parties were married on December 17, 1977, and
the Decree of Divorce was entered September 30, 1988, a marriage
of less than 11 years.

The parties were separated for

approximately the last two years of the marriage.

The marriage

was of nominal length.
Seventh, Dr. Dunn brought into the marriage a substantial
income of $71,000.00.

Dr. Dunn's income has continued to in-

crease, rising to $357,889.00 in 1987.

Both Dr. and Mrs. Dunn

enjoyed a comfortable lifestyle made possible by Dr. Dunn's
income.

Mrs. Dunn brought a modest income into the marriage but

is now pursuing a graduate degree which will provide her with
sufficient income to comfortably support herself.

In fact, Mrs. Dunn herself testified that the amount of
$200,000.00 would be sufficient to "cover expenses" allowing her
to get through school and earn an income sufficient to support
herself.

R000242 at 139-140. Mrs. Dunn has already been awarded

more than this amount by the District Court.
Eighth, at the time of marriage the parties had extremely
disparate standards of living.

It would be inequitable if those

standards of living are now completely equalized.
Ninth, the parties had no children and thus the responsibilities associated therewith are not present in the instant case.
Tenth, the effort exerted and contribution made by Dr. Dunn
toward the acquisition of marital property exceeded that by Mrs.
Dunn.

Dr. Dunn labored for 60 to 70 hours per week and traveled

extensively.

Mrs. Dunn worked 5 hours per week, took care of the

domestic responsibilities and frequently vacationed during Dr.
Dunn's professional travel.
Finally, Mrs. Dunn attempts to distort the percentage of the
marital estate she was awarded by inflating the value of the
marital estate by not recognizing the credits for premarital
assets awarded to Dr. Dunn.

Properly recognizing the credits

results in a 38% to 62% division as compared to the 24% to 76%
distorted division presented by Mrs. Dunn.

See Appendix 1.

Considering these factors, the 38% to 62% division of the
marital estate was equitable and should be affirmed.

D.

The Lifestyle Enjoyed By The Parties Was An Appropriate
Factor To Be Considered By The Court.

Mrs. Dunn finally argues that the fact that she enjoyed a
standard of living beyond her own earning capacity during the
marriage was not a permissible ground for the District Court to
apportion the marital property as it did.

Mrs. Dunn's argument

is misplaced on several grounds.
First, the standard of living was not the sole factor
considered by the Court.

As evidenced by its findings, the

District Court considered all of the relevant factors.
Second, the lifestyle enjoyed by the parties is an appropriate factor to consider in setting alimony as well as making
property distributions.

In Petersen v. Petersen, 737 P.2d

237 (Utah App. 1987), this Court stated:
In cases like the instant one, life patterns
have largely been set, the earning potential
of both parties can be predicted with some
reliability, and the contributions and
sacrifices of the one spouse in enabling the
other to attain a degree have been compensated by many years of the comfortable
lifestyle which the degree permitted.
Id. at 242 n.4.
In the instant case, however, no contribution or sacrifice
was made by Mrs. Dunn which allowed Dr. Dunn to obtain the degree
or establish his earning capacity.

Accordingly, an unequal

although equitable distribution of the marital estate was made.
Similar distributions have been approved by the Utah Supreme
Court in numerous cases.

See, e.g., Turner, 649 P.2d 6 (wife
-IS-

received somewhere between 27% and 42% of marital assets);
Berger, 713 P.2d 695 (husband received 40%); Cox v. Cox, 532 P.2d
994 (Utah 1975) (wife received 33%)- Other jurisdictions have
approved unequal but equitable distributions based on similar
facts.

See, e.g. Whispell v. Whispell, 534 N.Y.S.2d 557 (1988)

(11.5% to husband who earned little income, did not sacrifice
opportunities to maintain household, raised no children, and
enjoyed a high standard of living during marriage); McKee-Johnson
v. Johnson, 429 N.W.2d 689 (Minn. App. 1988) (40% to wife where
court recognized the husband's expertise in increasing the
partiesf wealth).
Finally, assuming arguendo that the standard of living
enjoyed during the marriage is an improper factor under Utah law
to consider in making a property distribution, the District
Court's decision can still be affirmed on the basis of the other
properly considered factors as discussed above.

Jesperson, 610

P.2d at 328.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the apportionment of the marital
estate by the District Court was equitable and, accordingly, the
Decree of Divorce should be affirmed.
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!lark W. Sessions
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Harold K. Dunn, and
Harold K. Dunn, M.D., P.C.
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Patricia A. O'Rorke
BERMAN & O'RORKE
50 South Main Street
Suite 1250
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144
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APPENDIX I

Mrs. Dunn

Dr. Dunn

Total

264,813

839,098

1,103,911

(2,100)

( 8,700)

(10,800)

2. Airplane

(22,400)

(22,400)

3. Roberson Contract

(22,493)

(22,493)

4. License Agreement

(232,572)

(232,572)

(115,845)

(115,845)

262,713

437,088

699,801

or 38%

or 627.

Note 1
Credits for:

1. Automobiles

5. Profesional
Corporation

Note 1 - Total property distribution per Appendix 1 of Brief of
Appellant•

DIV7/21-3/8

